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THE PROPER SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW
IN CIVIL REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Andrea Lovell*
Abstract: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), two 1996 amendments to
the Immigration and Nationality Act, eliminated direct judicial review in the federal courts of
appeals of final removal orders for aliens convicted of certain enumerated crimes. The
legislation also appears to limit the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal district courts.
While most circuit courts agree that some degree of habeas corpus review of removal orders is
constitutionally mandated, several have interpreted AEDPA and IIRIRA as limiting the scope
of that review. This Comment argues that the scope of habeas corpus review in civil removal
proceedings remains unchanged. Because AEDPA and IIRIRA did not explicitly and
unambiguously eliminate habeas corpus review, courts should not interpret them as doing so.
Furthermore, the Constitution requires that aliens have the opportunity to challenge removal
proceedings in Article 1I courts. Finally, as a matter of policy, there are several critical
removal-related decisions that should not be left exclusively to executive officials.
"Only by zealously guarding the rights of the most humble,
the most unorthodox and the most despised among us
can freedom flourish and endure in our land."1
The federal courts of appeals are divided over the precise scope of
habeas corpus review available in removal' proceedings involving aliens
convicted of certain crimes in the United States. In 1996, Congress twice
amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),3 the statute that has
governed immigration and nationality since 1952. The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)4 and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
*The author would especially like to thank Dan Kowalski for his time, suggestions, and editorial
assistance.
1. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 166 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
2. Removal is a term adopted in 1996 to describe the processes formerly known as "exclusion"
and "deportation." Although the term "removal" now refers to both, the statutory grounds of
inadmissibility and deportability remain distinct. See infra Part I.B.1.
3. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. II 1996)) [hereinafter INA].
4. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 19,
21, 22,28,40,42,49,50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AEDPA].
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(IIRIRA)5 not only eliminated direct judicial review of final removal
orders in these cases, but also appeared to restrict habeas corpus review.
The present scope of habeas review of removal orders is uncertain
because the amended INA fails to address the independent grant of
habeas corpus jurisdiction to federal district courts in 28 U.S.C. § 2241.6
There is general agreement among the courts that some degree of habeas
corpus review of final removal orders is required by the Constitution.7
However, while some courts find subject matter jurisdiction over even
nonconstitutional claims,8 others will no longer consider any claims that
do not implicate "grave" constitutional questions where removal might
result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."9 The proper scope of
habeas corpus review in cases where aliens convicted of certain crimes
face final orders of removal is the fundamental issue addressed by this
Comment.
This Comment argues that AEDPA and IIRIRA should not be
interpreted as narrowing the scope of habeas corpus review of civil
removal proceedings. Rather, federal district courts should continue to
review both constitutional and nonconstitutional claims in habeas corpus
5. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Supp. II
1996)) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1994) states: "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions."
7. See, e.g., Williams v. INS, 114 F.3d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that at least habeas relief
protected by Suspension Clause remains available); Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) ("[H]abeas review remains available to appellee to raise substantial constitutional
questions."); Vargas v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 1537, 1542 (S.D. Cal. 1997) ("The Court finds that § 440
of the AEDPA does not preclude the Court from reviewing plaintiff's constitutional claims upon a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus."); Duldulao v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476, 479 (D. Haw. 1997)
("Habeas corpus review under § 2241 is justified if an alien subject to an order of deportation based
on violation of crimes enumerated by Congress demonstrates some grave constitutional error or a
fundamental miscarriage ofjustice.") (citations omitted).
8. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that scope of habeas
review is unchanged by AEDPA).
9. See, e.g., Thomas v. INS, 975 F. Supp. 840, 849 (W.D. La. 1997) (applying "miscarriage of
justice" standard, but limiting review to issues collateral to order of removal); Duldulao, 958
F. Supp. at 479 ("Habeas corpus review under § 2241 is justified if an alien subject to an order of
deportation based on violation of crimes enumerated by Congress demonstrates some grave
constitutional error or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.") (citations omitted); In re Castellanos,
955 F. Supp. 96, 97 (W.D. Wash. 1997) ("[TIhe writ is available only to challenge a fundamental
miscarriage of justice."); Mbiya v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ("[Ihe Constitution
requires only that the writ of habeas corpus extend to those situations in which the petitioner's
deportation would result in a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice.").
Proper Scope of Habeas Corpus Review
proceedings pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on them by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Part I discusses congressional plenary power over immigration
matters, the removal procedure itself, and the evolution of the use of
habeas corpus petitions to challenge final orders of removal. Part II
compares the various positions adopted by the circuit courts on the issue
of the scope of habeas corpus review. Finally, Part III argues that as a
matter of statutory construction, constitutional law, and policy, full
review of all claims remains available in habeas corpus, despite the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Congressional Authority over Immigration Matters
1. Plenary Power
Perhaps more than any other area of the law, immigration is
characterized by great judicial deference to the political branches of
government.'0 Congressional and executive "plenary power" over
immigration matters was first recognized in the late nineteenth century."
U.S. Supreme Court opinions during this period established a preference
for committing immigration decisions to the political branches of
government based on general notions of sovereignty. In Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, also known as the Chinese Exclusion Case, the
Court considered a Chinese alien's constitutional challenge to a recently
enacted statute that would bar his re-entry into the United States after a
visit to China. 3 Denying petitioner's claim, Justice Field declared: "The
power of the government to exclude foreigners from the country
whenever, in its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion,
has been asserted in repeated instances, and never denied by the
executive or legislative departments."' 4 Basing its decision on the need to
preserve national security and independence, the Court clearly
10. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranaban, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) ("[O]ver no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete...."); see also Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292,305 (1993).
11. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889).
12. See Note, The Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Review for Administrative Deportation
Decisions, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1850, 1851 (1997).
13. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 589.
14. Id at 606-07.
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established the right of the federal government to regulate immigration.'"
The plenary power doctrine was expanded in 1892 to encompass not
only substantive admission and exclusion standards, but also the
procedures for enforcing those standards. 6 Soon thereafter the doctrine
was extended to deportation cases as well as exclusion cases."
2. Due Process Limitations on Plenary Power
Although the plenary power doctrine remains essentially intact, it has
been tempered by due process concerns in the deportation context.' The
U.S. Supreme Court established early in the twentieth century that aliens
were entitled to procedural due process in deportation proceedings.'9
Although full trials are not required in all immigration matters, the Court
held that failure to provide an alien with notice and an opportunity to be
heard when faced with deportation violated the Fifth Amendment."
Modem due process analysis looks to the three-part Mathews v. Eldridge
test for determining due process requirements in a given context.2' In
Landon v. Plasencia, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this test was
applicable in an immigration case.' To determine whether an alien's due
process rights have been violated, the court must consider: (1) the
interests at stake for the individual; (2) the probability that a procedural
error could lead to the wrongful deprivation of that interest; and (3) the
interest of the government in using existing procedures.' Although
particular due process requirements are not always entirely clear under
this test, it appears that in deportation cases a higher level of due process
15. Id. at 603-04.
16. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J 545, 552 (1990); see also
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (holding that judiciary could not review
discretionary administrative determination of excludability).
17. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
18. See Note, supra note 12, at 1857.
19. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
20. Id.
21. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
22. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
23. Id.
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is required than in most other immigration matters.24 Aliens facing
deportation have a due process right to counsel at their own expense,'
and the government must make reasonable efforts to ensure the presence
of its witnesses at deportation hearings for cross-examination.26 The
question presented by AEDPA and IIRIRA is whether due process might
also require independent review by Article III courts of adverse
deportation-related decisions.
B. Overview of Immigration Proceedings
1. Statutory Grounds for Removal
Congress has extended its plenary power to define categories of aliens
who may be excluded or deported from the United States. Deportability
grounds apply not only to undocumented aliens, but also to aliens living
legally in the United States.2" Only when aliens acquire U.S. citizenship
do they become immune from deportation.29 The 1996 amendments to
the INA now refer to both exclusion and deportation as "removal"
proceedings." Despite this change, it should be noted that the grounds
for inadmissibility and deportability remain distinct,31 and that aliens in
deportation proceedings continue to benefit from greater constitutional
protections than those facing exclusion. 2 This Comment focuses on that
aspect of removal formerly known as deportation.
24. See Daniel Kanstroom, Judicial Review of Amnesty Denials: Must Aliens Bet Their Lives to
Get into Court?, 25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 53, 73 (1990) ("Courts have declined to invoke
procedural due process in exclusion hearings to the same degree as in deportation hearings.").
25. Orantes-Hemandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549,554 (9th Cir. 1990).
26. Saidane v. INS, 129 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Board of Immigration
Appeals abused its discretion by admitting hearsay statements because it failed to make reasonable
efforts to present witness for cross-examination); see also Cunanan v. INS, 856 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th
Cir. 1988) (same).
27. INA §§ 212,237,8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
28. INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
29. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 54,
56 (1997) ("[A]liens can be deported, but citizens, if they can be expelled at all, must be exiled,
which is likely to be a more difficult procedure for the nation to undertake.").
30. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 374 (2d ed. 1997).
31. See INA §§ 212,237, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182,1227.
32. See generally Legomsky, supra note 30.
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Particularly sweeping changes in this area took effect in 1996 with the
enactment of two amendments to the INA. 33 In April 1996, President
Clinton signed into effect the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA).34 In September, he signed the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)35 as well. Both were
responses to mounting popular fears about potential criminal activity by
aliens in the wake of the Oklahoma City, World Trade Center, and 1996
Atlanta Olympic Games bombings.36 To effectuate this goal, Congress
both expanded the grounds for removal37 and streamlined the removal
procedure.38
In addition to expanding general grounds for removal and
streamlining procedures, Congress created a special class of aliens: those
convicted of certain enumerated crimes. 39 These criminal aliens are not
only removable, but are apparently no longer entitled to judicial review
of the deportation decision.' The enumerated crimes include certain
firearms offenses, 4' controlled substance violations,42 certain espionage
and sabotage offenses,43 certain crimes involving moral turpitude,' and
33. Trevor Morrison, Note, Removed from the Constitution? Deportable Aliens'Access to Habeas
Corpus Under the New Immigration Legislation, 35 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 697, 699 (1997).
34. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18,
19, 21, 22, 28,40,42,49, 50 U.S.C.).
35. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Supp. II
1996)).
36. See, e.g., Sara Candioto, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:
Implications Arising from the Abolition of Judicial Review of Deportation Orders, 23 J. Legis. 159,
159 (1997); Dulce Foster, Note, Judge, Jury and Executioner: INS Summary-Exclusion Power
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 82 Minn. L. Rev.
209,209 (1997).
37. See Julie K. Rannik, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Death
Sentence for the 212(c) Waiver, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 123, 124 (1996) ("[AEDPA]...
expanded grounds of deportability to cover all drug offenses, including marijuana possession, and all
crimes of moral turpitude ....").
38. Mary Reiko Osaka, New Limits Placed on Judicial Review of Administrative Orders Under
the Immigration and Nationality Act, Haw. B.J., Sept. 1997, at 12, 12 ("[W]ith the enactment of...
[IIRIRA], Congress has set new parameters for judicial review of matters arising under the INA in
an effort to streamline and expedite the process.").
39. INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1996).
40. INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); see also infra text accompanying note 98
(providing statutory language).
41. INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 111996).
42. INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B).
43. INA § 237(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D).
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"aggravated felonies."'4 AEDPA and IIRIRA also vastly expanded the
definition of the term "aggravated felony" in 1996. Whereas the original
definition in 1988 included only murder, drug trafficking, and firearms
or destructive device offenses,4 6 INA section 101(a)(43) now sets forth
twenty-one classes of aggravated felonies.47 In many cases, the 1996
amendments have reduced the sentencing requirements used to determine
whether a particular crime constitutes an "aggravated felony."'4
Furthermore, this new definition of the term "aggravated felony"
provides for retroactivity to varying degrees.49 Therefore, an alien may
be found to have an aggravated felony on her record even if the
conviction was entered before the enactment of the statute.
2. Removal Procedure
The decision to pursue the removal of a given alien is left to the
discretion of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).50 Given
the agency's limited resources, the inevitable decisions to pursue some
aliens and to ignore others function as a form of prosecutorial discretion.
The actual removal process begins with a determination by the INS,
acting on behalf of the Attorney General," that an alien is statutorily
"inadmissible" or "deportable" pursuant to INA sections 212 or 237.2
Once the INS chooses to charge an alien with removability, the INS
initiates an administrative hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) by
filing a Notice to Appear (NTA) for removal proceedings. 3 The INS
must decide after filing the NTA whether the alien will be detained until
the hearing or released on bond.'
44. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2XA)(i).
45. INA § 237(aX2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2XA)(iii).
46. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
47. INA § 101(a)(43XA)-(U), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(A)-(U).
48. See Legomsky, supra note 30, at 447-48.
49. Md For a more detailed discussion of the retroactivity issue, see, for example, Candioto, supra
note 36, Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause,
73 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 97 (1998), and Anjali Parekh Prakash, Changing the Rules: Arguing Against
Retroactive Application ofDeportation Statutes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1420 (1997).
50. See Note, supra note 12, at 1853.
51. INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (Supp. II 1996).
52. INA §§ 212,237,8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996).
53. INA § 239(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (Supp. 11 1996).
54. INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (Supp. II 1996).
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At the individual removal hearing before the IJ, the alien and the INS
have the opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine
witnesses. 5 The alien will generally testify and be asked to plead to the
allegations if he or she has not already plead. 6 The burden of proof is
initially on the alien to demonstrate lawful residence in the United
States.5 7 The burden then shifts to the INS to prove deportability
grounds.58 At the conclusion of the administrative hearing, the IJ must
decide whether to issue an order of removal or to grant relief from
removal.5 9 An adverse decision by the IJ can be appealed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals by either party.'
3. Procedural Differences Between Removal Hearings and
Criminal Trials
Although many of the same liberty interests may be at stake,
removable aliens are not afforded the same constitutional protections as
criminal defendants. Perhaps the most critical difference is that criminal
defendants receive judicial review in an Article III court, whereas
removable aliens receive only administrative review by an executive
agency." There are also several procedural differences between removal
proceedings and criminal trials. For example, although an alien facing
removal is entitled to be represented by counsel, the alien is fully
responsible for the cost of such representation.6' Realistically, many
aliens in removal proceedings do not have the resources to obtain private
counsel. 3 Consequently, as many as ninety percent of all detained aliens
are unrepresented at their hearings.' Furthermore, although the alien is
provided with an interpreter if necessary, only the alien's own testimony
55. INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (Supp. II 1996).
56. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(b) (1997).
57. INA § 240(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(B).
58. INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).
59. INA § 240(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).
60. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21(a) (1997).
61. See Legomsky, supra note 30, at 540.
62. INA § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A).
63. See Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and
Administrative Reform, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1647, 1650 (1997).
64. Id. at 1664.
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and the questions put to the alien are interpreted.65 Thus, the alien may be
unable to understand discussions between counsel or between the IJ and
counsel.
Other rules governing the proceedings also differ. The formal rules of
evidence do not apply in removal hearings.' Hearsay evidence is
admissible in removal proceedings,67 and the "exclusionary rule"
generally does not apply. 8 Additionally, the ex post facto prohibition is
inapplicable, so laws may be applied retroactively to removable aliens.69
Although administrative hearings have always been dramatically
different from criminal proceedings, the potentially harsh effects of the
system were mitigated by the possibility of appellate review by an
Article III court prior to 1996.
C. Habeas Corpus Review oflmmigration Decisions
1. Pre-1952 Habeas Corpus Review
Prior to 1952, petitions for writs of habeas corpus were the primary
means by which aliens could seek judicial review of deportation orders.7 °
During this time, most cases were governed by the 1891 and 1917
Immigration Acts, which precluded judicial review "except insofar as it
was required by the Constitution."7 Despite this jurisdictional limit,
courts continued to entertain a broad range of claims in habeas corpus.
These included not only constitutional claims, but also nonconstitutional
claims involving statutory interpretation and abuse of discretion.73 Even
in cases where petitioners' habeas petitions were ultimately denied,
65. El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742 (9th
Cir. 1991).
66. Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1990).
67. 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(c) (1997).
68. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
69. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952).
70. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
71. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229,234-35 (1953).
72. Id. at235.
73. See infra Part In.B.1.
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courts consistently reached their decisions on the merits of a given
alien's claims rather than on jurisdictional grounds.74
In cases governed by the 1891 and 1917 statutes, courts routinely
reviewed nonconstitutional claims involving the executive branch's
interpretations of immigration statutes.75 For example, in Delgadillo v.
Carmichael, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the executive's
interpretation of the term "entry" in an immigration statute.76 In that case
the alien had resided in the United States for almost twenty years before
embarking on an intercoastal voyage as a crew member on an American
merchant ship. Delgadillo's ship was torpedoed, and he was taken to
Cuba for a week.77 Two years after returning to the United States, he was
convicted of second-degree robbery and ordered deported under a statute
providing that an alien sentenced to more than one year in prison within
five years after "entry" into the United States shall be taken into custody
and deported. On review, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the alien a
writ of habeas corpus because it would be irrational to find that the alien
effected another "entry" after his unforeseeable detour to Cuba.79
Courts during this time also consistently reviewed the legality of
deportation and exclusion orders and denials of discretionary relief.8"
74. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 78 (1957) (holding
that Attorney General applied correct legal standard in determining whether statutory prerequisites
for discretionary relief had been met); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912) (holding that
determination that alien was deportable for practicing prostitution was based on sufficient evidence
and not unconstitutional because alien had fair hearing); Uyemura v. Carr, 99 F.2d 729,732 (9th Cir.
1938) ("We have carefully examined the record and it fails to show that the proceedings were unfair,
or were conducted in an improper manner, or that there was any abuse of discretion or any denial of
appellant's right to due process of law.").
75. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (rejecting executive's interpretation of
exclusion provision of procedural regulation); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915) (rejecting
executive's interpretation of public charge exclusion provision); Brief of Amici Curiae Law
Professors at 12, Mojica v. Reno, decision pending (2d Cir.) (No. 97-2599/2600) (citing Mahler v.
Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) (rejecting executive's interpretation of Espionage Act's deportation
provision)).
76. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947).
77. Id. at389.
78. Id. at 390.
79. Id. at 390-91.
80. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors at 24, Mojica (citing United States ex rel.
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (finding adequate allegation of failure to exercise
discretion in accordance with regulations)); see also Gonzalez-Martinez v. Landon, 203 F.2d 196
(9th Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. de Sousa v. Day, 22 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1927); United States
ex rel. Berman v. Curran, 13 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1926).
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Review of discretionary decisions was particularly important because, as
several courts noted, "discretionary waivers serve to reconcile the rigid
categories of the immigration laws with the claims of compassion in
individual cases."'" In Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, the Second Circuit
overturned a denial of discretionary suspension of deportation because
the relevant statute was applied arbitrarily.82 In that case, an Italian alien
who was held in INS custody was present in the United States solely
because of World War 11.83 The court held that the Attorney General's
decision to refuse to consider pre-examination or suspension of
deportation for all aliens present due to the war was capricious and
irrational.' Accordingly, the court ordered the alien's release."
2. Habeas Corpus Review: 1952-1961
In 1952, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
that is currently in effect.86 The INA gave aliens the right to challenge a
deportation order in an action for declaratory relief pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as well as in a habeas corpus
proceeding.87 However, amendments to the INA soon eliminated APA
declaratory actions for aliens.88 During this period, habeas corpus
remained an important means for securing judicial review. 9
3. Habeas Corpus Review: 1961-1996
In 1961, Congress amended the INA, providing that petitions for
direct review by the courts of appeal "shall be the sole and exclusive
81. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors at 20, Mojica; see also Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220,
221 (2d Cir. 1992); Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).
82. Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 999, 1003 (2d Cir. 1950).
83. Id. at 1002.
84. Id at 1003.
85. Id
86. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1996)).
87. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349
U.S. 48 (1955)).
88. Id. A full discussion ofthe APA is beyond the scope ofthis Comment
89. See id.
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procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation." 9
Nevertheless, Congress expressly preserved the habeas corpus
jurisdiction of federal district courts. INA section 106(a)(10) provided
that "any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may
obtain judicial review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings." 9
Legislative history indicates that habeas corpus was expressly preserved
in the INA to avoid constitutional challenges.92 In fact, the Congressional
Record states: "Nothing contained in the bill is, or can be, designed to
prevent an alien from obtaining review [of a deportation order] by habeas
corpus." 93 Although most courts during this time did not look beyond the
INA to find habeas corpus jurisdiction, those that did found jurisdiction
under both INA section 106(a)(10) and 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the general
grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction to federal courts. 94 INA section
106(a)(10) remained in effect until 1996.
4. The 1996,Amendments and Habeas Corpus Review
In 1996, AEDPA and IIRIRA dramatically limited judicial review for
aliens convicted of the enumerated crimes.95 First, AEDPA not only
struck the habeas corpus provision in the INA, but also replaced it with
the following language: "Any final order of deportation against an alien
who is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense
covered in [certain specified sections] ... shall not be subject to review
by any court."96 IIRIRA further revised the INA by completely repealing
section 106"7 and replacing it with INA section 242, which provides that:
90. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, repealed by IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 242(b),
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-612.
91. INA § 106(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10), repealed by IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 242(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-612.
92. 87 Cong. Rec. H12,177 (1961) (statement of Rep. Waiter) ("[W]e were very much concerned
over the possibility of writing an unconstitutional statute by depriving even an alien the right to a
writ of habeas corpus.").
93. 87 Cong. Rec. H12,176 (statement of Rep. Walter).
94. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 162; see also Sotelo Mondragon v. lichert, 653 F.2d 1254, 1255 (9th
Cir. 1980) (finding jurisdiction to review deportation order under INA § 106(a)(10) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241).
95. See supra Part I.B.1.
96. AEDPA § 440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-77, repealed by IIIRA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 242(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-612 (emphasis added).
97. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, repealed by IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 242(b),
110 Stat. at 3009-612.
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Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have
jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who
is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense
covered in section 212(a)(2) or 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or
any offense covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of this title for which
both predicate offenses are, without regard to their date of
commission, otherwise covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)."
This elimination of judicial review appears to have left many deportation
decisions entirely to the discretion of officials in the executive branch.
II. CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SCOPE OF HABEAS
CORPUS REVIEW
The courts that have interpreted the jurisdictional effects of the 1996
amendments to the INA agree that Congress may not constitutionally
close all avenues of judicial review." Most of these courts have found
that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 still provides for some degree of habeas corpus
review."ee Although several courts have declined to specify the precise
scope of review,'0 ' those that have considered the scope issue can be
divided into three general groups. The majority of courts find jurisdiction
over a very narrow range of claims, holding that habeas review is
available only in cases involving "grave constitutional error" or where
removal might result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice. '0 2
98. INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1996).
99. See, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 791 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Because the INS acknowledges
that some avenue for judicial review remains available to address core constitutional and
jurisdictional concerns, we find that section 440(a)'s repeal of our jurisdiction to review final orders
of deportation does not raise a constitutional issue.); Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir.
1996) ("['We do not foreclose judicial review of all claims by aliens arising in the course of
deportation proceedings.'); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that "at
least some avenue for judicial relief remains available"); Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828, 837 & n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that "some means of seeking judicial relief remain available").
100. See, e.g., Yesil, 958 F. Supp. 828; Duldulao v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476 (D. Haw. 1997);
Eltayeb v. Ingham, 950 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Dunkley v. Perryman, No. 96 C 3570, 1996
WL 464191 (N.D. fll. Aug. 9, 1996); Mbiya v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
101. See, e.g., Mansour v. INS, 123 F.3d 423, 426 n.3 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Because the petitioner is
before us seeking direct review of a final deportation order, we need not address the scope of review
that is available on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus."); Kolster, 101 F.3d at 791 ("As the nature
and scope of habeas review available to aliens like Kolster is not properly before us at this time, we
do not reach those questions."); Hincapie-Nieto, 92 F.3d at 31 ("We express no opinion on the
nature of the remedy or the scope of review that remains available in any court.").
102. See infra Part HA.
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A second group has adopted a slightly broader approach, holding that
habeas review is still available for all constitutional claims. 3 A third
group, which is considerably smaller than the others, holds that habeas
review is still fully available for both constitutional and nonconstitutional
claims. 1"4
A. Habeas Jurisdiction for Claims Involving a "Fundamental
Miscarriage ofJustice"
Of the courts that have considered the jurisdiction-stripping provisions
of AEDPA and IIRIRA, the majority have concluded that habeas
jurisdiction exists only over cases where removal might result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. The court in Mbiya v. INS °5 was the
first to reach this conclusion. Mbiya was found deportable because he
violated a controlled substance statute. 10 6 The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia denied Mbiya's request for habeas corpus
review on the grounds that, as a result of the 1996 amendments, the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his petition. 7 Despite Mbiya's
claims that AEDPA was unconstitutional based on the Suspension
Clause0 8 and ex post facto prohibition, his petition was dismissed."°
The Mbiya court proposed a balance between Congress's plenary
power over immigration matters and the constitutional limits imposed by
the Suspension Clause."0 The court held that the habeas corpus
jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 should be preserved, but only
to the extent required by the Constitution. Without citing authority, the
court determined that the Constitution requires the extension of habeas
103. See infra Part ll.B.
104. See Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); see also infra Part II.C.
Constitutional claims are based on deprivations of rights protected by the U.S. Constitution.
Nonconstitutional, or "subeonstitutionar' claims, on the other hand, refer to the interpretation and
application of statutes, regulations, and administrative guidelines that do not arise directly out of the
Constitution. See Motomura, supra note 16, at 561.
105. 930 F. Supp. 609.
106. Id. at 610.
107. Id.
108. U.S. Const. art. I § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
109. Id. at 613.
110. Id. at 612.
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corpus jurisdiction only in cases where removal would result in a
"fundamental miscarriage ofjustice."' I
Shortly after the Mbiya decision, several other district courts
considered the same jurisdictional issue. In Duldulao v. Reno, the court
dismissed petitioner's claims of inadmissible hearsay and abuse of
discretion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."2 The Duldulao court
carefully differentiated between habeas review and direct review, noting
that habeas corpus is an "extraordinary remedy.""' For this reason,
habeas review should be allowed only pursuant to the "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" standard for enforcement of due process
requirements."' Although Duldulao's claims might have been properly
considered on direct review prior to the enactment of AEDPA, they were
not claims of constitutional magnitude for purposes of habeas corpus
review."5 Several other courts have recently adopted the Mbiya court's
jurisdictional standard for allowing habeas corpus review." 6
While these courts agree on the application of a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" standard, they are divided as to what that standard
is." 7 The Mbiya court provided the example that this standard would
allow an alien claiming mistaken identity an avenue for habeas corpus
relief from deportation."' The courts following Mbiya suggest that
"fundamental" due process claims and other "grave" constitutional errors
should be considered as well. Although courts adopting this standard
have yet to clarify their precise meaning, it is clear that these courts take
jurisdiction over only an extremely narrow range of habeas corpus
claims.
111. Id.
112. Duldulao v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476,477 (D. Haw. 1997).
113. Id. at480.
114. Id.
115. Id. at482.
116. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Martinez v. Reno, No. Civ. A. 1:97CV3361TWT, 1998 WL 7459 (N.D.
Ga. Jan. 8, 1998); United States v. Zadvydaz, 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. La. 1997); Eltayeb v. Ingham,
950 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Castellanos, 955 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Powell v.
Jennifer, 937 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
117. Duldulao, 958 F. Supp. at 479 n.2.
118. Mbiya v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
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B. Habeas Jurisdiction for All Constitutional Claims
Although the majority of courts allow habeas corpus relief only when
"grave" constitutional questions are concerned, some courts grant a
slightly broader scope of review. For example, in Salazar-Haro v. INS, 9
the Third Circuit held that where any constitutional rights are at stake,
judicial review may not be eliminated by statute. Although the court
expressly limited its holding to cases where petitioners seek final review
of removal orders, 20 this holding appears to be considerably broader than
the Mbiya approach. A federal district court in the Southern District of
California reached the same conclusion in Vargas v. Reno, reasoning that
"there must be a judicial forum in which an alien subject to a deportation
order may raise his constitutional claims." ' Interestingly, the Vargas
court interpreted the Suspension Clause as prohibiting Congress from
barring aliens' constitutional claims, "grave" or not." It held that aliens
have a Fifth Amendment right not to be deported without due process,
and that "this can only be guaranteed if there is judicial review of
deportees' constitutional claims. '' "
C. Habeas Jurisdiction for All Claims
Not all courts interpret AEDPA and IIRIRA as limiting the scope of
their habeas corpus jurisdiction. At least one court has held that habeas
corpus review remains fully available, despite the 1996 amendments. In
Mojica v. Reno, a federal district court in the Eastern District of New
York held that AEDPA and IIRIRA "leave undisturbed the independent
authority of federal district courts to entertain habeas petitions under
section 2241 of Title 28."' 24 The court relied upon the "clear statement
rule," recently articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Felker v.
Turpin 25 which prohibits Congress from repealing jurisdiction by
implication." 6 The Mojica court emphasized that no mention is made of
119. 95 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996).
120. Id. at311.
121. Vargas v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
122. Id. at 1542.
123. Id. at 1541.
124. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
125. 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2338-39 (1996).
126. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 159.
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section 2241 as an independent grant of jurisdiction in either amendment
to the INA. 27 Since Congress is presumed to know the law, if it had
meant to repeal section 2241 jurisdiction, it would have done so
expressly. 28 The Mojica court thus determined that full habeas review
for both constitutional and nonconstitutional claims remained available
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Although no courts have held that habeas
review of nonconstitutional claims remains available, at least one has
suggested that possibility.2 9
III. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION
OVER ALL FINAL ORDERS OF REMOVAL
Several statutory arguments support an interpretation of AEDPA and
IIRIRA that does not limit the federal district courts' habeas corpus
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Additionally, pre-1952 case law and
modem due process analysis confirm that habeas corpus review
of both constitutional and nonconstitutional claims is required by the
Constitution. For many important removal-related issues, habeas
provides the only opportunity for review by an Article III court.
A. Congress Did Not Intend to Foreclose Section 2241 Habeas Review
ofAll Claims
Three canons of statutory construction suggest that courts should not
interpret AEDPA or IRIRA so as to repeal, or limit, the habeas corpus
jurisdiction conferred on them by 28 U.S.C. § 2241. First, as mentioned
by the Mojica court, Congress may not repeal the habeas corpus
jurisdiction of federal district courts by implication. Second, statutory
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the alien in the deportation
context. Finally, courts generally do not interpret jurisdiction-stripping
127. Id at 160.
128. Id.
129. See Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Because Yesil presented substantial
constitutional claims based on due process, the court did not specifically hold that non-constitutional
claims continued to be reviewable in habeas corpus. Id. at 839. However, the court did hold that 28
U.S.C. § 2241 was not repealed by AEDPA because such repeal cannot be made by implication. Id.
at 837-38. The court rejected the government's "plain language" argument for finding express
repeal. Id. at 838. The court also declared that Congress may not eliminate habeas review over final
orders of deportation unless there is some alternative avenue for review. Id.
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provisions in one statute to limit the jurisdiction conferred on them by
other statutes.
1. Jurisdiction May Not Be Repealed by Implication
Because neither AEDPA nor IIRIRA make any mention of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 as an independent jurisdictional ground, habeas corpus review
pursuant to that statute must remain fully available. In Felker v. Turpin,
the U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle that repeals of
jurisdiction by implication are disfavored.3 ° This rule is often referred to
as the "clear statement rule." Only a clear statement of congressional
intent will suffice to eliminate jurisdiction.' The Felker Court
considered section 106(b)(3)(E) of AEDPA, which bars appeals to the
U.S. Supreme Court of circuit court denials of successive habeas
petitions.13 1 The Court held that this provision did not eliminate its
original jurisdiction to heat such petitions under section 2241.' 33 In
reaching this holding, the Felker Court followed the precedent set by
Exparte Yerger,134 a U.S. Supreme Court decision from 1868. The
Yerger Court considered whether the Judiciary Act of 1868, which
repealed an 1867 Act extending original habeas jurisdiction to all cases
involving restraints of liberty, also repealed the original habeas
jurisdiction granted to the U.S. courts by section 14 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789.13' The Court noted that no mention was made of section 14 and
stated that any repeal of jurisdiction granted by that Act must have been
by implication only. 36 Given the importance of habeas corpus to the U.S.
legal system, the Court held that "repeals by implication are not favored.
They are seldom admitted except on the ground of repugnancy."' 37
The "clear statement rule" set forth in Felker and Yerger prohibits the
repeal of habeas corpus jurisdiction by implication. Although AEDPA
and IIRIRA explicitly eliminated direct judicial review of certain
removal orders by federal district courts, neither makes reference to
130. Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2338.
131. See Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 159.
132. Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2338-39.
133. Id. at 2337.
134. 75 U.S. 85 (1868).
135. Id at 95.
136. Id at 105.
137. Id.
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independent grounds for review, such as habeas corpus review pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Mojica court correctly determined that the
1996 amendments did not repeal or amend section 2241. The court relied
on the maxim that Congress is presumed to know the law, and concluded
that it would have expressly made reference to section 2241 if it had
intended to do so. 3 ' The purpose of the "clear statement rule," according
to the Mojica court, is to ensure that "courts do not have to resort to
divining phantom or unarticulated Congressional intentions to repeal
habeas jurisdiction where there is statutory silence."''
2. Statutory Ambiguities Must Be Resolved in the Alien's Favor
In addition to the prohibition on repeals by implication, a second
canon of statutory construction requires courts to construe statutory
ambiguities in favor of aliens facing deportation. The U.S. Supreme
Court so held in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan:
We resolve the doubts in favor of that construction because
deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of
banishment or exile. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a
residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty. To construe
this statutory provision less generously to the alien might find
support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the
individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his
freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several
possible meanings of the words used. 4°
The requirement that courts construe ambiguities in favor of the alien
denotes a policy preference for protecting aliens whose fundamental
liberty interests are at stake. Although the Yerger and Felker decisions
specifically refer only to the complete repeal of jurisdiction, they should
be interpreted in this context to apply equally to any limitations placed
on the scope of habeas corpus review. In other words, Congress should
be required to expressly limit the scope of federal district courts'
jurisdiction if it intends to do so at all.
138. Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 319 (1983)); see also
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979) (same).
139. Mojica, 970 F. Supp. at 160.
140. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citation omitted).
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Where there is any doubt as to whether Congress intended to limit the
availability of judicial review in cases where aliens are subject to final
orders of removal, courts should read the applicable statutes in the light
most favorable to the alien. AEDPA and IIRIRA are ambiguous insofar
as they refer specifically to the INA rather than to habeas corpus
jurisdiction generally. In this instance, AEDPA and IIRIRA should not
be read as limiting the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction in removal
proceedings. Since Congress did not express a clear and unambiguous
intent to limit the scope of section 2241, courts should find that this
independent jurisdictional grant is still fully available for all claims.
3. Courts Do Not Favor Interpretations That Repeal Their Jurisdiction
To refuse to find limits on the scope of section 2241 habeas corpus
review in this context would be consistent with the historic reactions of
courts to congressional attempts to limit their powers of review.'
41
Restrictions on jurisdiction generally have been read quite narrowly, and
there is an evident judicial preference for preserving jurisdiction
wherever possible. 42 As early as 1868, in Exparte McCardle,43 the U.S.
Supreme Court noted that the repeal of one statutory grant of jurisdiction
may not affect others.'" The same reasoning was recently employed in
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center 45 In that case, the Court held that
although section 302(a) of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 barred district courts from reviewing most final administrative
determinations of Seasonal Agricultural Worker status, the courts
141. See Lucas Guttentag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Federal Court Jurisdiction-Statutory
Restrictions and Constitutional Rights, 74 Interpreter Releases 245, 246 (1997); see also Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) ("The courts should restrict access to judicial review only
upon a showing of'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent").
142. One commentator noted:
Current law is characterized by a strong presumption that Congress did not preclude judicial
review of agency actions as recently espoused in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians. The Supreme Court has also ruled that the courts can "restrict access to judicial
review only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent."
Peter Hill, Did Congress Eliminate All Judicial Review of Orders of Deportation, Exclusion, and
Removalfor CriminalAliens?, Fed. Law., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 43, 44 (citations omitted).
143. 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
144. Although the Court in that case declined to find jurisdiction over McCardle's petition for
habeas corpus, it specifically reserved the right to exercise jurisdiction over similar cases in the
future on alternative grounds. Id. at 515.
145. 498 U.S. 479 (1991).
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continued to have general federal question jurisdiction over the issue.
"We hold that given the absence of clear congressional language
mandating preclusion of federal jurisdiction ... the District Court had
jurisdiction to hear respondents' constitutional and statutory challenges
to INS procedures."' 46 The McNary Court stressed that it was attempting
to preserve the availability of meaningful judicial review for
petitioners. 47 The case stands for the principle that even where Congress
may have intended to eliminate or limit access to judicial review,
limitations in one statute should not be presumed to apply to other
independent statutory bases of jurisdiction unless expressly stated.
B. Repeal of Habeas Jurisdiction Would Be Unconstitutional
Even if Congress had expressed a clear intent to foreclose all judicial
review for criminal aliens, AEDPA and IIRIRA would be
unconstitutional. The courts that have considered the jurisdictional
effects of these amendments agree that the Constitution requires some
avenue for judicial review. 4 The proper process to determine the scope
of that review is defined by case law interpreting statutes that, like
AEDPA and IIRIRA, limited judicial review to the minimum required by
the Constitution.'49 Even when such legislation was in effect prior to
1952, courts routinely found jurisdiction over a wide range of claims.
Furthermore, a detailed due process analysis bolsters the conclusion that
full habeas corpus review of constitutional and nonconstitutional claims
must remain available despite the jurisdiction-stripping provisions in the
1996 amendments.
1. The Proper Scope ofHabeas Jurisdiction Is Defined by Pre-1952
Decisions
In Heikkila v. Barber, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that courts
interpreting the 1891 and 1917 Immigration Acts consistently reviewed
both constitutional and nonconstitutional claims in habeas corpus,
despite the fact that judicial review was statutorily limited to the fullest
146. Id. at 483-84 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 484.
148. See cases cited supra note 99.
149. See Guttentag, supra note 141, at 258.
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extent possible under the Constitution.' The Heikkila Court also found
that these jurisdiction-stripping acts "clearly had the effect of precluding
judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar as it was required
by the Constitution..'' The fact that courts continued to review all
claims during this time indicates that habeas corpus review of even
nonconstitutional claims is constitutionally mandated.' This conclusion
was reached by Professor Henry Hart, who suggested that since the
courts in habeas corpus have always enforced statutory requirements,
"Justice Clark must... be understood [in Heikkila] as saying that the
Constitution gives the alien a right, among others, to have the statutes
observed."'53
Whether or not Congress intended to eliminate the statutory grant of
habeas corpus jurisdiction previously codified at INA section 106(a)(10),
the Constitution operates independently to provide aliens access to the
writ. Although the pre-1952 courts did not specify the provisions upon
which they relied, constitutional limits may be found in the Suspension
Clause,5 4 the separation of powers doctrine, 55 and the due process
requirement.5 6 Because habeas corpus review of both constitutional and
nonconstitutional claims is required by the Constitution, the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions in AEDPA and IIRIRA should not affect federal
district courts' authority to review a broad range of removal-related
issues in habeas corpus proceedings.
2. Due Process Provides Significant Protections for Aliens
Careful balancing of the three Mathews v. Eldridge'57 factors confirms
that habeas corpus review of even nonconstitutional claims is required by
150. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
151. Id. at 234-35.
152. See Morrison, supra note 33, at 701 ("Thus the Heikkila Court saw habeas as a constitutional
minimum ofjudicial review below which no statute could go.").
153. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1393 n.93 (1953).
154. See supra note 108.
155. A complete discussion of separation of powers in the removal context is beyond the scope of
this Comment. For more detailed analysis, see, for example, M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review-
A Nice Thing? Article III, Separation ofPowers and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act ofl996, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1525 (1997).
156. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
157. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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the Constitution. Only three factors are balanced: the private interests at
stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation of those interests, and the
government's interests.15  The Mathews test makes no distinction
between constitutional and nonconstitutional claims. Rather, the focus is
on whether the first two interests are so weighty in comparison with the
third as to require judicial review of all claims. In the removal context,
the minimal interest the government has in streamlining judicial review
is clearly outweighed by the life and liberty interests at stake for the alien
and the risk of erroneous deprivation when review is provided by an
agency that lacks sufficient neutrality.
a. The Private Interests at Stake
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that deportation
constitutes criminal punishment,'59 aliens in removal proceedings face
severe deprivations of liberty."6 The alien's interest in remaining in the
United States, where he or she may have found family, friends and
employment, is significant.16' Many legal permanent residents moved to
the United States at a very young age and may not speak the language or
be familiar with customs in their home countries. The consequences of
deportation may be particularly severe when an alien faces persecution or
death upon return to the home country. In that sense, life, as well as
liberty interests, may be at stake. In fact, one court referred to
deportation as a "sanction which in severity surpasses all but the most
Draconian criminal penalties."' 62 Throughout this century, courts have
articulated that "deportation is always a harsh measure,"'63 and that it
may "result... in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life
worth living."'" In Landon v. Plasencia, the U.S. Supreme Court itself
158. Id at 335.
159. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591
(1913); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
730 (1893).
160. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ("Though deportation is not technically a
criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay
and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious
one-cannot be doubted.").
161. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740.
162. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37,39 (2d Cir. 1977).
163. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,449 (1987).
164. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284 (1922).
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recognized that "once an alien gains admission to our country and begins
to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional
status changes accordingly."' 6 For this reason, removal is said tQ occupy
a "middle ground" between civil and criminal law in terms of this
balancing test.1
66
b. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
Also significant is the risk of erroneous deprivation. The lack of
independence between the adjudicative agencies-the IJs and the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA)-and the INS may undermine the
neutrality generally afforded by independent review. Each of these
agencies is part of the Department of Justice. 67 Because the INS serves a
prosecutorial function, adjudication at the IJ and BIA levels is not
sufficiently insulated to provide an alien with an impartial hearing,'
61
particularly if the alien's claim involves allegations of abuse of discretion
or other prosecutorial misconduct. Furthermore, whereas Article III
judges are entitled to life tenure, IJs and BIA judges may be appointed
and removed at the discretion of the Attorney General. 69 The Attorney
General also has the authority to review BIA decisions with which she
does not agree.70 Courts have long recognized the difference in the level
of due process protection provided by administrative appellate review as
opposed to review by an impartial Article III court.'
Because of this lack of impartiality, the risk of error in a removal pro-
ceeding is significantly greater than the risk of error in a criminal
proceeding. Absent habeas review, aliens in removal proceedings now
have no access to a courtroom whatsoever, whereas criminal defendants
receive habeas review only after criminal convictions and appeals in a
165. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
166. Lawrence E. Harkenrider, Due Process or "Summary" Justice?: The Alien Terrorist
Removal Provisions Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 4 Tulsa
J Comp. & Int'l L. 143, 158 (1996).
167. 28 C.F.R. § 0.1 (1997).
168. See Medina, supra note 155, at 1540.
169. INA § 101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (Supp. II 1996).
170. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1997).
171. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 61 (1932) ("[W]hen fundamental rights are in question,
this Court has repeatedly emphasized 'the difference in security of judicial over administrative
action."') (citation omitted).
Vol. 73:459, 1998
Proper Scope of Habeas Corpus Review
variety of judicial proceedings. 72 Furthermore, criminal aliens may not
petition for writs of habeas corpus until all other judicial remedies have
been exhausted" s and thus benefit from several layers of judicial review.
Interestingly, the majority of courts that follow the Mbiya approach
discussed above have improperly imported a criminal law standard into
civil immigration habeas proceedings. The "fundamental miscarriage of
justice" standard applied by these courts actually arose in a criminal case
involving federal post-conviction relief. Courts that apply this standard
in the removal context "fundamentally misconceive[ ] the nature and
purpose of the habeas corpus guarantee. The Great Writ assures that
independent judges will examine the legality, not just the constitu-
tionality, of detention ordered by the executive."'75 The "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" standard looks at the content of the particular
claim being raised, rather than at the general due process requirement
that the alien is entitled to have the decision reviewed by an independent
Article III court. This emphasis on the content of the claim is appropriate
in the criminal context because the defendant has already had some
judicial review of his or her case. However, it is inappropriate in the
removal context given that civil habeas petitions are now the only means
by which an alien may obtain judicial review.
c. The Government's Interests
The third factor, the government's interests, is much less weighty than
the other two factors. The government clearly has an interest in
eliminating the dangers posed by alien terrorists in the United States.
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But this interest is only marginally served by denying aliens access to an
Article III court. Moreover, alien terrorist removal procedures are
governed by an entirely different statutory provision than removal
procedures for other criminal aliens. 7 7 Allowing these other criminal
aliens access to federal courts in no way undermines Congress's intent to
172 See Guttentag, supra note 141, at 259.
173. Id.
174. See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of
Immigration Proceedings, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1411, 1471 n.266 (1997).
175. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors at 18, Mojica v. Reno, decision pending (2d Cir.)
(No. 97-2599/2600).
176. See supra Part I.B.1.
177. INA §§ 501-507, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1537 (Supp. II 1996).
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quickly remove alien terrorists. The government also has an interest in
conserving judicial resources."'8 However, the limitations on habeas
corpus review imposed by AEDPA and IIRIRA may not reduce costs to
a level significantly lower than the review provided under the INA.
Professor Lenni Benson suggests that if no statutory grant of habeas
corpus jurisdiction remains, courts will expend significant resources
determining which claims are "constitutional" for purposes of habeas
corpus review. 7 9 Litigating subject matter jurisdiction may actually lead
to longer delays and increased litigation and detention expenses.
There are also government interests that weigh directly in favor of
habeas corpus review. For example, the government has an interest in
ensuring that a fair process is implemented in the removal context.80
Consider the problems created by Bashaw v. Department of Justice.'8' In
that case, two border patrol agents violated a regulation requiring them to
notify the district director in instances where Soviet nationals might be
seeking asylum in the United States. Although the alien involved
indicated that he deserted his ship for "political and moral reasons,'12
the agents ordered him forcibly returned to the ship. An international
outcry resulted, and sixty senators requested an investigation into the
incident.8 3 This demonstrates that implementation of a procedure that
provides almost no due process protections for the alien can create
opportunities for increased error and could potentially lead to disrepute
in the international community.
A balancing of the three due process factors thus reveals that due
process requires independent review by the judiciary of final orders of
removal. The alien's life and liberty interests are clearly significant, as
are the risks of erroneous deprivation in proceedings that are not subject
to review by independent courts. Furthermore, the government's interests
in preventing alien terrorist activity and in judicial economy are not
substantially furthered by denying aliens any access to the courts.
178. Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 337, 351 (1997).
179. See Benson, supra note 174, at 1487-88.
180. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (stating that government has interest
in "foster[ing] the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders").
181. 39 M.S.P.B. 670 (1989), rev'd sub nom. Spurlock v. Department of Justice, 894 F.2d 1328
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
182. Id. at 675.
183. Russia May Have 'Switched' Defecting Soviet Seamen, S.F. Chron., Mar. 3, 1986, at 8.
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C. Limitations on Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction Would Prohibit Courts
from Hearing a Number of Important Claims
The majority of courts, which interpret AEDPA and IIRIRA as
limiting their habeas corpus jurisdiction to "constitutional" claims,
deprive aliens of the opportunity to bring significant statutory and
abuse of discretion challenges before federal district courts. This position
is not just erroneous and unconstitutional; it is bad policy. Many noncon-
stitutional removal-related issues need to be reviewed independently by
an impartial judiciary.
1. Claims Involving Statutory Interpretation
It is essential that district courts continue to review claims involving
statutory interpretation. For example, the INA presently includes no
definition of the term "moral turpitude," one of the enumerated crimes
that leaves aliens with no independent review."8 Because this concept is
vague, it is an area of potential inconsistency for which judicial review is
extremely important."' 5 In the past, Article III courts regularly reviewed
these determinations.' 8' For example, in Goldeshtein v. INS, the Ninth
Circuit overturned a published BIA decision holding that money-
laundering was a crime of moral turpitude.
187
Even crimes defined by the INA have given rise to challenges based
on statutory interpretation. For example, certain "aggravated felonies"
are not as clear as the statute might indicate.' Determining whether a
184. See Martin Arms, Comment, Judicial Deportation Under 18 USC §3583(d): A Partial
Solution to Immigration Woes?, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 656 n.17 (1990).
185. See L. Griffin Tyndall, Note, "You Won't Be Deported... Trust Me!" Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel and the Duty to Advise Alien Defendants of the Immigration Consequences of Guilty
Pleas, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 653, 654 n.6 (1996).
186. See, e.g., Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (holding that crime of conspiracy
was crime of moral turpitude for deportation purposes); Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 189 (5th Cir.
1996) (vacating BIA order and remanding for consideration of whether simple kidnapping is crime
of moral turpitude).
187. Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1993).
188. Challenges have been made to aggravated felony convictions based on "crimes of violence."
See Matter of Alcantar, 20 . & N. Dec. 801 (BA. 1994) (holding that involuntary manslaughter
constituted "crime of violence" and therefore "aggravated felony"). Crimes of violence are defined
by the INA as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16, excluding purely political offenses, for
which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)
(Supp. II 1996).
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crime committed is an aggravated felony is especially important, because
once criminals are considered aggravated felons for deportation
purposes, their opportunities for discretionary relief are drastically
restricted.189 In addition to defining specific crimes, courts have played a
critical role in determining what constitutes a "conviction" for
deportation purposes.' 9 Only aliens who are actually "convicted" of the
crimes enumerated by AEDPA and IIRIRA are barred from judicial
review.
If executive officials are granted unchecked authority to interpret
immigration statutes in any way they choose, extreme arbitrariness might
result. In the past, officials have interpreted statutes "to exclude able-
bodied immigrants in time of oversupply of labor, and to create a new
racial exclusion of Hindus on the ground that prejudice would prevent
them from finding work."' 9 ' That these determinations had to be rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court92 highlights the importance of judicial
review of these types of decisions.
2. Claims ofAbuse of Executive Discretion
Because so much authority is presently vested in the Attorney
General, it is critical that claims involving abuse of discretion be
reviewable in habeas corpus proceedings. AEDPA and IIRIRA not only
expanded the grounds for removal, but also limited the possibility that an
alien convicted of one of the enumerated crimes might obtain
discretionary relief.'93 Prior to 1996, INA section 212(c) granted the
Attorney General the ability to give an alien a "second chance" based on
ameliorating circumstances.'94 Such circumstances included length of
189. See Hill, supra note 142, at 44.
190. See generally Legomsky, supra note 30, at 410-30 (explaining that certain probation and
diversion programs may not constitute "convictions" for deportation purposes).
191. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors at 13, Mojica v. Reno, decision pending (2d Cir.)
(No. 97-2599/2600).
192. See id. at 14 (citing Healy v. Backus, 243 U.S. 657 (1917) (regarding Hindu workers), and
Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915) (Holmes, J.) (regarding oversupply)).
193. See Hill, supra note 142, at 44 ("There can be little doubt that most aliens with aggravated
felony convictions are not eligible for any relief from removal... regardless of the number of years
the offender has resided in the U.S. or how young s/he was upon initially becoming a legal
permanent resident.").
194. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182, repealed by IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304(b),
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597.
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residence, family and job opportunities in the United States, and
prior criminal convictions. 9 ' In 1996, section 212(c) was replaced by
section 240A, also known as cancellation of removal.'96 However,
aggravated felons and aliens deportable for security reasons are ineligible
for section 240A relief.'97 Where an alien is removable on other grounds,
such as a drug offense or crimes of moral turpitude, the decision to grant
relief is left to the discretion of the Attorney General.99
In addition to cancellation of removal, aliens convicted of
"particularly serious crimes" whom the Attorney General believes might
pose a danger to the United States are statutorily ineligible for asylum.' 99
Crimes that are "particularly serious" are not defined by the statute,
although aggravated felonies automatically qualify.00 In cases involving
lesser crimes, this determination has generally been fact-specific.20 '
Judicial review has been extremely important in this area, and the
discretionary decisions made by the Attorney General should continue to
be checked by Article III courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court declared in the nineteenth century that "[t]he
great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best and
only sufficient defence of personal freedom. 20 2 In 1996, Congress
enacted two pieces of restrictive legislation that appeared to place the
writ beyond the reach of aliens who, however rightly or wrongly, have
been convicted of crimes. Given that Congress did not expressly
eliminate the courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions brought under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, the courts should not interpret the statutes as stripping
them of any of their jurisdiction. Moreover, even if Congress had
intended to prohibit the courts from hearing habeas petitions of aliens,
the Constitution prohibits it from doing so. Numerous pre-1952 cases
195. See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85 (B.LA. 1978) (listing factors to be
considered by IJ when evaluating § 212(c) relief requests).
196. INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (Supp. II 1996).
197. INA § 240A(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c).
198. INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
199. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv) (Supp. II 1996).
200. INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).
201. See Matter of Frentescu, 18 .& N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.LA. 1982).
202- ExparteYerger, 75 U.S. 85, 95 (1868).
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heard all kinds of claims in habeas corpus at a time when habeas
jurisdiction was limited to that required by the Constitution. Congress
cannot overrule these cases by legislative fiat. Similarly, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that aliens have an
opportunity to have their claims heard by an Article III court before they
are deported, perhaps to face persecution or even death. Thus,
notwithstanding the 1996 legislation, federal district courts should
continue to hear a broad range of constitutional and nonconstitutional
issues raised in habeas corpus petitions by criminally convicted aliens.
After all, if habeas corpus is to continue to function as "the great bulwark
of personal liberty,"2 3 it must remain available to those whose liberty
most precariously hangs in the balance.
203. 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1333, at 206
(Da Capo Press 1970) (1833).
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